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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
All parties to the product liability action pending in the 
United States District Court are identified in the caption above. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction over the questions of state law certified by the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah is conferred 
upon the Supreme Court of Utah by Article VIII, §3 of the 
Constitution of Utah. The District Court's Certification Order is 
dated December 19, 1990, and this Court accepted the certified 
questions by Order dated January 3, 1991. By Order dated January 
23, 1991, this Court entered a Certification Order pursuant to Rule 
41(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure accepting specific 
certified questions for consideration, designating the record on 
appeal for this matter and establishing procedures and times for 
the parties' submissions of briefs and oral argument. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The certified questions from the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah accepted for consideration are: 
1. Whether Utah adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products" 
exception to strict products liability as set forth in Comment k to 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)? 
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, should FDA 
approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of law to have 
satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to the Comment k 
exception, or should that determination be made on a case by case 
basis? 
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and if it is 
further determined that its application to FDA approved 
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is 
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a 
question properly to be presented to the jury? 
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k is to 
be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by case 
basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from the drug 
which were are (sic) not alleged to have been personally suffered 
by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe" 
determination? 
The standard of review for certified questions is de novo as 
to the issues of law with deference given to the District Court's 
factual determinations. Simon v. G.D.Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397 
(8th Cir.1987). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS 
It is anticipated that Upjohn will continue to rely upon 
certain present and former provisions of the Utah Code relating to 
product liability and punitive damages, to wit, Utah Code Ann. §78-
18-2 and 78-15-1 et seq., referenced in defendant's Reply Brief in 
Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the United 
States District Court. (See Record on Appeal at pp. 186-188, 
hereinafter "Rec.pp - .") As such statutes are not 
determinative,they have been reproduced in the body of this brief, 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(2). Other 
statutory and constitutional provisions at issue are also 
reproduced in the body of this brief. Pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(f)(1), the District Court's Certification 
Order, with attachment, thereto, is reproduced in an addendum to 
this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 6, 1990, Upjohn filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Strict Liability Claims in the United 
States District Court contending that Comment k, the "unavoidably 
unsafe" product exception to the doctrine of strict liability 
established by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, 
applied to all prescription drugs as a matter of law, including 
Halcion, regardless of whether the drug products could be made 
safer and notwithstanding the availability of safer alternatives. 
(Rec. p.31) Based thereon, Upjohn asserted that the doctrine of 
strict tort liability is unavailable, as a matter of law, to any 
person injured by a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
pharmaceutical product. Plaintiffs' Response and Memorandum in 
Opposition to that motion was filed on April 24, 1990. (Rec.p.87) 
Upjohn mailed its reply to plaintiffs7 counsel on Friday, May 4, 
1990, so that the reply was received less than 24 hours before 
scheduled oral argument. 
On May 8, 1990, oral argument was heard before the Honorable 
David K. Winder, United States District Judge, and the issues were 
taken under advisement. When Judge Winder's daughter accepted an 
offer of employment from Upjohn, Judge Winder sua sponte recused 
himself from this action, and the case was reassigned to the 
Honorable J. Thomas Greene. No further briefing was submitted by 
the parties, and Judge Greene heard oral argument on defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 28, 1990, along with 
several other pending motions and matters. The strict liability 
issue was taken under advisement. 
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By Order dated December 19, 1990, Judge Greene certified 
questions arising from defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Strict Liability Claims to this Honorable 
Court and requested acceptance of these questions on an expedited 
schedule for the filing of briefs and oral argument, as a six-week 
jury trial in this case is scheduled to commence on April 29, 1991. 
Initial acceptance of the certified questions was made by an order 
and notice on the clerk of The Supreme Court of Utah dated January 
3, 1991. 
During a hearing held before Judge Greene on January 11, 1991, 
and again during the course of the two day trial of Upjohn's 
copyright action on January 16 and 17, 1991, Judge Greene addressed 
the procedures for consideration of the certified questions, 
including expedited consideration thereof, as well as the 
composition of the record on appeal. Judge Greene requested and 
received the parties' input as to the composition of the record on 
appeal, and the agreed upon record with United States District 
Court docket numbers was transmitted to the Supreme Court under 
memo dated January 18, 1991, which record was accepted by this 
Court's Order of January 23, 1991.1 By Order of the United States 
1 Upjohn had initially expressed a desire to expand the record on 
appeal to include matters which were not presented to the District 
Court. In response, Judge Greene noted that if other such matters 
were necessary and appropriate for consideration, they should have 
been submitted to the District Court for consideration at the 
appropriate time. Thereafter, Judge Greene proposed the 
composition of the record on appeal, and there was neither 
objection nor request to supplement. Pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 41(e), the record on appeal is established and 
closed. Should Upjohn now, notwithstanding its acceptance of the 
record on appeal, attempt to submit materials not presented to the 
District Court, such materials and arguments based thereon such 
argument should be disregarded and stricken. 
-5-
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District Court dated February 1, 1991, the record on appeal was 
corrected to reflect the erroneous exclusion of one exhibit and the 
erroneous transmittal of certain other exhibits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As the District Court has already provided a statement of 
facts for this Court's consideration, only the following brief 
summary is required. 
This drug product liability action arises from the death of 
Mildred Lucille Coates on June 19, 1988, with liability of the 
defendant, The Upjohn Company (hereinafter "defendant11 or "Upjohn") 
predicated upon negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty 
and other theories of law. (Complaint filed 24th day of March, 
1989 in the United States District Court, District of Utah, Rec. pp 
1-2 0) The action is brought by Ilo Marie Grundberg, on behalf of 
herself, and by Janice Gray, as personal representative of the 
estate of Mildred Lucille Coates, deceased. The action arises from 
Grundberg's use of defendant Upjohn7s drug product, Halcion 
(generic name "triazolam"), a sleeping pill, of which there are and 
were on June 19, 1988, other available, effective and safer 
alternatives on the market. Plaintiffs allege that many of 
Halcion,s adverse side effects arise from its actions on the user's 
central nervous system and manifest themselves in a panoply of 
psychiatric effects including severe depression, psychosis, 
depersonalization, paranoia, hallucinations, aggressive assaultive 
behavior and homicidal compulsion. (Rec. pp. 6 & 8) 
Plaintiffs' allegations include that Halcion is defectively 
designed. Plaintiffs7 further allege that Upjohn concealed and 
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misrepresented data regarding these and other adverse side effects 
in the presentation of its new drug application for Halcion to the 
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") , that it was marketed in a 
dangerously excessive dosage, overpromoted, inadequately designed, 
tested and inspected and was accompanied by inadequate warnings. 
(Rec. pp.6 & 10) This action therefore directly involves a drug 
not properly marketed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs allege that they were 
injured as a consequence of Ilo Grundberg's ingestion of the 
defective product Halcion. 
On June 19, 1988, Mrs. Grundberg, in accordance with a 
prescription by her physician, consistent with Upjohn's recoitimended 
dosage, took a .5 milligram dose of Halcion. She had been using 
Halcion in accordance with her physician's instructions and in 
conformity with Upjohn's recommendations. Mrs. Grundberg, however, 
fell under Halcion induced intoxication, suffered central nervous 
system reactions to triazolam which were known to Upjohn and 
fatally shot her 83 year old mother, Mildred Lucille Coates.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should not adopt the unavoidably unsafe products 
exception to strict products liability as set forth in Comment k to 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). The 
instant case does not present the Court with a situation 
contemplated by the Comment in that Halcion, the prescription drug 
at issue herein, is a sleeping pill which, according to the Food 
and Drug Administration (MFDAM) and the other evidence of record, 
is neither unique, essential to the public welfare, nor superior to 
2 Criminal charges brought against Mrs. Grundberg were dismissed 
based upon the Halcion induced intoxication. 
-7-
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existing, safer alternatives. Further, Comment k is a restrictive 
provision which undermines the important policies underlying the 
doctrine of strict liability, i.e., shifting the burden of risk of 
economic injury resulting from the use of a defective product from 
the public, which is least able to shoulder that burden, to the 
manufacturer of the dangerous and defective product, which is 
better able to eliminate the risks and apportion the costs. 
Assuming that this Court determines that Comment k 
appropriately can be and should be adopted as the law of Utah, such 
comment should be a limited exception to the black letter law 
restated at Section 402A and should be available as an affirmative 
defense on a case by case basis. The overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions considering the applicability of Comment k to a 
strict products liability action involving prescription drugs which 
ultimately have adopted that Comment have done so on this basis. 
Courts in these jurisdictions have declined to adopt Comment k as 
an exception which swallows the rule and have rejected arguments 
similar to those made by Upjohn here. Courts have examined the 
policies underlying strict products liability and have concluded 
that a selective application of Comment k furthers the interests of 
society of encouraging better and safer drugs and more than 
adequately protects the interests of the manufacturers. The courts 
have determined that compliance with FDA regulations is not 
dispositive of a prescription drug's safety or efficacy and that 
state tort law complements rather than hinders the functioning of 
the FDA. Strict tort liability provides a mechanism by which 
injured citizens may seek redress for damages resulting from 
-8-
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injection into the stream of commerce of avoidably unsafe drugs. A 
blanket immunity for prescription drug manufacturers deprives such 
citizens of an opportunity to show that such drugs are avoidably 
unsafe, defective and unreasonably dangerous based entirely upon 
their inclusion in a particular category. The courts have examined 
the language of Comment k and found it clear that the drafters of 
the Restatement intended that only some prescription drugs be 
exempt from a strict products liability action and, in fact, that 
the very exemption sought by Upjohn was proposed and rejected by 
the American Law Institute. In its statutory and common law, the 
state of Utah and this Honorable Court have emphasized the same 
policy considerations other jurisdictions have found determinative 
of this issue. Adopting Comment k as a limited exception to 
Section 402A of the Restatement to be pleaded as an affirmative 
defense and to be considered on a case by case basis is consistent 
with the law of the Utah and the better reasoned cases reported 
elsewhere. 
Assuming that Comment k is adopted as a limited exception to 
strict products liability, submitting the issue of whether a 
prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe to a jury best comports 
with the constitutional and statutory law of Utah, is most 
consistent with the traditional fact-finding function of the jury 
system and places Utah in accord with the better reasoned cases 
reported in other jurisdictions. That the issue of a prescription 
drug product's relative safety goes to the jury does not preclude 
Upjohn or any other drug manufacturer from moving for summary 
judgment on that issue, in which situation the trial court could 
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consider whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the drug's safety. 
Finally, if this Court adopts Comment k as a limited exception 
to strict products liability to be pleaded and proved by a 
manufacturer as an affirmative defense on a case by case basis and 
if the unavoidably unsafe issue is to be submitted to the jury, or 
even if such issue is left to the court, all evidence of adverse 
drug reactions associated with the drug needs to be considered. 
Concepts of due process and fundamental fairness require such a 
rule since the manufacturer will present any and all evidence of 
the risks and dangers associated with alternate products. Also, 
evidence of such adverse reactions will be admissible under a 
theory of negligent design; thus, the jury will hear evidence of 
same in any event. The admissibility of such evidence is 
particularly appropriate in the prescription drug context in which 
the drug operates on the central nervous system and causes adverse 
reactions which manifest themselves as psychiatric reactions along 
a full spectrum. Lastly, the legislature of the state of Utah has 
at one time adopted a statute mandating the admissibility, during a 
strict products liability trial, of evidence going to the risks, 
hazards and dangerous propensities of an allegedly defective 
product. Allowing an airing of such evidence best serves the 
traditional concept embodied in American jurisprudence of an open 
and public proceeding where decisions are reached based upon a full 
consideration of all relevant facts. t 
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ARGUMENT ) 
Question 1, An Affirmative Defense To Strict 
Liability, To Be Proven By The 
Manufacturer, For "Unavoidably Unsafe" 
Products As Proposed By Comment k To 
Section 402A Of The Restatement (Second) 
Of Torts Would Add An Unrecognized Defense 
Under Utah Law 
In Hahn v. Armco Steel Co,, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), this 
Court adopted Section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
recognizing and adopting the doctrine of strict product liability. 
This Court held that strict liability is imposed upon all 
manufacturers of products for injuries caused through the product's 
defectiveness and its unreasonably dangerous characteristics. Such 
adoption was based in part upon the clearly recognized public 
policy, to wit, that the cost of havoc brought by defective 
products should not be borne by those "who are powerless to protect 
themselves". Hahn 601 P.2d at 156. 
In adopting Section 402A, this Court specifically considered 
defenses to strict liability, as well as the comments to Section 
402A. The only two defenses recognized to strict products 
liability in Hahn were misuse of the product by the user or 
consumer, citing Comment g, as well as knowledge of the defect by 
the user or consumer who is aware of the danger and yet who 
unreasonably proceeds to make use of the product, i.e., assumption 
of risk, citing Comment n to Section 402A. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 158. 
This Court considered the comments to 402A and yet chose to adopt 
only two of those comments. 
This Court's express consideration and adoption* of only those 
two comments and the defenses contained therein evidence caution 
-11-
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against the unthinking acceptance and application of the comments 
in the Restatement. Such caution is particularly appropriate where 
Comment k is concerned, for Comment k is in fact a restrictive 
provision contrary to the express purposes and public policies 
underlying the doctrine of strict liability, to wit, the safety of 
the citizens of the state of Utah and the proper and appropriate 
shoulders upon which to place the costs of injuries resulting from 
products placed in commerce for the express purpose of amassing 
wealth from those individuals subsequently injured and others who 
use such products. In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. , 116 Wise.2d 166, 
342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 826 (1984) the court 
held: 
Although we adopted sec. 402A in Dippel v. 
Sciano, supra. we specifically declined to 
accept or reject any of the comments, 
[citation omitted] We have not adopted comment 
k to sec. 402A, and we decline to do so in this 
case. We conclude that the rule embodied in 
Comment k is too restrictive and, therefore, 
not commensurate with strict products liability 
law in Wisconsin. 
Drug companies, like other sellers or 
manufacturers, have a duty to produce and 
market reasonably safe products. We recognize 
that in some exigent circumstances it may be 
necessary to place a drug on the market before 
adequate testing can be done. Insofar as these 
circumstances exist, we agree with the comment 
that strict liability should not be imposed. 
However, we find no exigent circumstances which 
would excuse DES producers or marketers from 
adequately testing DES before it was placed on 
the market. Although there was a societal 
interest in preventing miscarriages in 
pregnancy, alternative treatment was available, 
and the problem did not approach epidemic 
proportions. Even assuming there were exigent 
circumstances in 1947 necessitating the use of 
DES in pregnancy without adequate testing, an 
additional ten years had elapsed by the time 
-12-
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the plaintiff's mother took DES. Thus, it 
would appear the drug companies had sufficient 
time to test DES thoroughly even if the 
original need to place it on the market 
foreclosed adequate testing at that time. 
Accordingly, we hold that DES producers or 
marketers may be held strictly liable if the 
plaintiff establishes the five elements 
specified earlier. 
Collins, 116 Wise.2d at 197, 342 N.W.2d at 52.3 (emphasis added) 
Perhaps this Court will wish to consider potential 
applicability of Comment k when a truly exceptional, desirable and 
socially necessary life-saving product is at issue. In the present 
case, however, under the facts as presented and found by the 
District Court, such consideration is inappropriate. Upjohn cannot 
and does not dispute that the record is fraught with factual 
questions as to whether safer alternative sleeping pills existed on 
the market at the time Halcion caused the death of Mildred Lucille 
Coates. (Certification Order p.5) This case involves a sleeping 
pill which even the FDA found to be neither unique nor particularly 
essential (Rec. at p. 127, Ex."B,f to Plaintiffs' Response and 
Memorandum) and which it has classified as presenting no advance 
over existing therapeutic alternatives. (Rec. p.92) Such a case 
presents an inappropriate scenario for this Court's consideration 
of the potential applicability of Comment k as a new affirmative 
defense to strict liability in Utah. 
Comment k was formulated to provide a limited exception to a 
manufacturer's strict liability for those truly essential products 
which were in fact unavoidably unsafe yet essential to the public 
3 Upjohn's counsel in the present case argued the Collins case to 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, yet neglected to mention this 
decision in its initial brief to the District Court. 
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welfare. The public policy and the societal interests underlying 
strict liability, as found by this Court in Hahn, supra, ensure 
that the costs of any defect are borne by the manufacturer 
receiving the profit from the sale rather than from those members 
of the public receiving the injuries. This Court has previously 
considered the comments to Sec. 402A and determined that only two 
of those comments enunciate legitimate defenses to a strict 
liability claim brought and prosecuted under the law of Utah. , 
Hahn, supra. Adherence to prior precedent and to the prevailing 
public policies recognized by this Court clearly support Utah's 
rejection of Comment k in its entirety, particularly in light of 
the factual record before this Court. If this Court were to adopt 
Comment k, however, the express provisions of that Comment prohibit 
the application espoused by Upjohn. It is essential to recognize 
that Upjohn, in actuality, does not urge this Court to adopt 
Comment k as written. Rather, Upjohn asserts that Utah should 
grant blanket immunity from strict liability to one class of 
manufacturers. That is clearly not an adoption of Comment k to 
Sec. 402A, and for the safety of the citizens of Utah as well as 
the proper apportionment of costs from injury, it must be rejected. 
Subquestion A. The Majority Of Jurisdictions, Following 
Better Reasoned Analysis And Upon Policy 
Considerations In Accordance With Those of 
Utah, Hold That Comment k To The 
Restatement Second of Torts, Sec. 402A Is 
A Limited Exception To Strict Liability To 
Be Proven By A Defendant As An Affirmative 
Defense Rather Than A Blanket Immunity 
J
 Granted To One Class Of Manufacturers. 
The available relevant case law and authorities were 
previously briefed and addressed in Plaintiffs' Response in 
—i A — 
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Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(Rec. pp 96-117) Therefore, the argument herein will endeavor to 
briefly apprise this Court of the continued uniform rejection 
throughout the United States of Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 
470 (Calif.1988), respond to contentions and argument made by 
Upjohn in its reply brief to the District Court (Rec. p.174) and 
apprise the Court of other relevant Utah decisions impacting upon 
this issue. 
Preliminarily, it is crucial to recognize what Upjohn is 
endeavoring to have this Court do, should it decide that Comment k 
will be adopted in Utah, and how such position is not only directly 
contrary to the public policies of the state but also seeks to 
twist the Restatement and its Comments beyond recognition. The 
text of Sec. 402A provides the black letter statement of the law 
found by the Restatement and adopted by this court in Hahn, and the 
text constitutes the teeth of its mandate. Upjohn urges this Court 
to transform a narrow, limited, specific and qualified defense 
contained in a Comment, upon which Upjohn bears the burden of 
proof, into a blanket exemption for one class of manufacturers, to 
wit, prescription drug manufacturers. Upjohn then further attempts 
to have this Court issue a ruling which strikes forever more any 
count predicated upon strict liability for each and every citizen 
of the state of Utah thereby depriving such citizen of an 
opportunity to establish that it is a defective and unreasonably 
dangerous prescription drug which caused his or her injury. Even 
Upjohn recognizes, however, pursuant to the anomalous California 
case which it urges upon this Court, that prescription drugs can be 
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held to be defective as well as unreasonably dangerous in design if 
they are neither properly marketed nor accompanied by adequate 
warnings. Upjohn's Reply, Rec. p.176. 
The continued vitality and availability of strict liability as 
a cause of action against prescription drug manufacturers was 
recognized in Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 751, P.2d 
470, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1988), and continues to be recognized as a 
viable cause of action against prescription drug manufacturers by 
California citizens. In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Co. , 711 
F.Supp.546 (S.D.Calif.1989), the district court addressed and 
discussed the Brown decision and denied summary judgment on the 
strict liability claims sought by defendant therein in that factual 
questions existed with regard to the adequacy of warnings. 
Therefore, Upjohn's reliance upon Brown is misplaced to the extent 
that the defendant seeks, contrary to the law of California, that 
this Court not only adopt Brown but also extend Brown so that the 
limited affirmative defense of Comment k would somehow be 
transformed into an absolute barrier to any strict liability action 
against a prescription drug manufacturer. Upjohn urges this 
position despite the fact that even California, under Brown, 
recognizes that a pharmaceutical manufacturer's potential 
responsibility under the doctrine of strict liability is a question 
of fact for the jury upon a showing of disputed evidence. 
Since the submission of the initial briefs to the District 
Court on this issue, numerous other State Supreme and Appellate 
courts, as well as federal district courts applying state law, have 
considered the issue and unanimously and uniformly have reached the 
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conclusion that the Comment k "unavoidably unsafe" affirmative 
defense should be made on a case by case basis with regard to 
prescription drugs. These decisions include: Savina v. Sterling 
Drug, Inc., 247 Kan. 105, 795 P.2d 915 (1990); Pollard v. Ashbv, 
793 S.W.2d 394 (Mo.App.1990) (en banc) motion for rehearing or 
transfer to Supreme Court of Missouri denied (July 2, 1990) 
application to transfer denied (September 9, 1990); Senn v. 
Merrell-Dow, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215, Ans. conformed to, 850 F.2d 
611 (9th Cir.1988); Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 802 P.2d 
1346, 1991 WL 1246 (Wash.1991); Miles Laboratories, Inc. Cutter 
Laboratories Div. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107 (Md.1990)4. The Court of 
Appeals of Florida is also apparently about to come into accord 
with the majority of jurisdictions.5 Several other courts, in 
addition to those enumerated above and identified in Judge Greene's 
Certification Order at p.7, have determined that the case by case 
approach for application of Comment k should be followed. These 
include: Rohrbough by Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 719 
F.Supp. 470 (N.D.W.Va.1989) (applying West Virginia law); Singer 
v.Sterling Drug Co., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert denied 409 U.S. 
878 (1972) (applying Indiana law); Hawkinson v. A. H. Robins Co., 
595 F.Supp. 1290 (D.Colo.1984) (applying Colorado law). 
4 The court in Miles Laboratory addressed a prescription product 
available only through a physician. The court did not 
automatically apply Comment k but rather engaged in a product 
specific detailed analysis for five and one half pages. The court 
cited to Fellows v. U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F.Supp. 297 
(D.Md.1980), wherein the District Court wrongly predicted that 
Maryland would apply Comment k to all prescription drug products, 
and concluded that the prescription product at issue was subject to 
Comment k only after the case specific analysis, employed by the 
vast majority of other jurisdictions. 
5 Adams v. G.D.Searle & Co., Inc., 1991 WL 3575 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 
Jan 18, 1991) (not yet been released for publication.) 
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In reality, by asking this Court to prohibit the pursuit of 
any strict liability count in any pharmaceutical action ever 
brought in Utah, Upjohn is asking this Court to hold that strict 
liability has been preempted as a viable cause of action in Utah. 
Upjohn's argument is predicated essentially on two trembling 
pillars, to wit, comprehensive federal regulation by the FDA and 
availability of insurance.6 Both of these arguments have been 
properly rejected by this Court. In Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc. , 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984), this Court specifically held, 
in accordance with the vast majority of jurisdictions, that FDA 
regulations regarding prescription drugs "are merely minimum 
standards" and a manufacturer's compliance therewith will not 
relieve it of potential liability under state law. 
The holdings of the court in MacGillierav v. Lederle 
Laboratories, 667 F.Supp 743 (D.Md.1987), are instructive and in 
clear accordance with the law of Utah, as recognized in Barson, 
regarding the effect of Federal Regulations. In MacGillieray the 
court specifically held that comprehensive federal regulations in 
the area of marketing and design did not preempt strict products 
liability tort law on defective design even though the product at 
issue was a vaccine. The court also found support in a decision of 
the United States Supreme Court and quoted the following: 
We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption 
from the comprehensiveness of regulations than 
from the comprehensiveness of statutes. As a 
result of their specialized functions agencies 
6 As noted previously, Upjohn especially has no basis upon which 
to argue this fictitious insurance crisis rationale since it has 
sworn to interrogatory answers that it is self-insured in this 
action. (Rec. p 117). 
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normally deal with problems in far more detail 
than does Congress. To infer pre-emption 
whenever an agency deals with a problem 
comprehensively is virtually tantamount to 
saying that whenever a federal agency decides 
to step into a field, its regulations will be 
exclusive. 
Id. at 745, citing Hillsborough County Florida v. Automated Medical 
Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2377, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
The court in MacGillierav continued and recognized that "a 
tort judgment against a drug manufacturer may in fact accelerate 
development of better, safer products" and that "public policy 
militates against finding as a matter of law that FDA approval of a 
particular drug relieves a pharmaceutical company of further 
responsibility to continue research and testing to develop safer 
products." MacGillieray, 667 F.Supp. at 745. Significantly, the 
court also observed the choice which this Court must make on behalf 
of the state of Utah. "A state may decide that while it must abide 
by the FDA's determination that a drug is marketable, the 
manufacturer must nonetheless bear the expense of the risk of 
injuries, particularly where there is evidence that suggests that 
the product may be subject to improvement." Id. at 745-746. 
"Federal legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as 
the floor of safe conduct; before transforming such legislation 
into a ceiling on the ability of states to protect their citizens, 
and thereby radically adjusting the historic federal-state balance, 
courts should wait for a clear statement of congressional intent to 
work such an alteration." Id. at 746, citing Ferebee v. Chevron 
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Chemical Co,. 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C.Cir.), cert denied 469 U.S. 
1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432 (1984). 
By its very title, Comment k to Sec. 402A only applies to 
"unavoidably unsafe" products, and as found by the vast majority of 
decisions previously cited, such comment necessitates an evaluation 
of whether the product at issue can be made safer and whether such 
danger which exists is in fact "unavoidable". The latter of these 
two components of an unavoidably unsafe product clearly 
contemplates an examination of whether suitable safer alternatives 
are available. The FDA does not make any such analysis or 
decision. The fact that there may be a more effective drug or a 
superior alternative available to the drug sought to be licensed 
for marketing is irrelevant to the FDA as clearly evidenced by its 
approval of Halcion despite its findings that Halcion was neither 
unique nor essential and that it presented no advance over 
available alternatives. (Rec. P.94 and Exhibit "B" to Plaintiffs' 
Response and Memorandum in Opposition). 
The availability of a doctrine of liability without fault 
reflecting decades of American jurisprudence and development of the 
law, has been found by this Court to be a valid public policy 
serving the interests of the citizens of this state by spurring 
safety research that may reveal hidden or unrevealed dangers. 
Hahn, supra. What Upjohn in fact asks this Court to adopt is a 
rule which directly inures to benefit producers who are unaware of 
risks and thus tends to perpetuate and encourage ignorance. 
Further, such a rule affirmatively encourages the most rapid race 
to market to allow the "first" manufacturer to reap the enormous 
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profits available from the introduction of a new prescription drug 
at the expense of sufficient and scientifically honest testing. 
The absolute prohibition of the remedy of strict liability which 
Upjohn seeks to have this Court announce is, in fact, contrary to 
the holding of its alleged "lead" authority in California and is in 
truth nothing more than a back-handed attempt at preemption7 and 
contrary to all decisions considering the issue. See e.g., In Re 
Tetracycline Cases. 747 F.Supp 543, 547-548 (W.D.Mo. 1989) 
(collecting almost twenty decisions rejecting preemption), as well 
as Masur v. Merck & Co. Inc., 742 F.Supp 239, 247 (E.D.Pa. 1990) 
(rejecting preemption and further finding that the federal 
regulations of prescription drugs serve a different purpose than 
state tort law as the former merely limits the manufacture of such 
product to those few applicants who meet stringent and specific 
criteria while the latter serves the different purpose of 
compensating victims injured by those very products). Recourse to 
state tort law was found necessary to encourage safer products. 
The court in Masur also observed that even pursuant to Pennsylvania 
law, it is the manufacturer which must show compliance with the 
applicable standards of care in order to avoid strict liability. 
Id at 252. 
In affirmatively rejecting the Brown decision and determining 
that Comment k applicability, in accordance with the vast majority 
of jurisdictions, is an affirmative defense to be proven by the 
manufacturer, the court in Pollard v. Ashbv, supra, first 
7 Upjohn has repeatedly asserted and represented that it is not 
seeking preemption. Yet in truth, such is the rule it seeks this 
Court to impose. 
-21-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
recognized that the American Law Institute itself defeated a motion 
to exempt all prescription drugs from strict liability based upon 
the alleged public policy concerns of encouraging research testing 
and development. Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 400, citing 38 ALI Proc. 
19, 90-98 (1961).8 The court then held: 
Where the case involves a design defect in 
a prescription drug, the burden shifts to the 
manufacturer to show that the drug falls within 
the realm of comment k protection. Thus 
several states have held that the defendant 
must raise comment k as an affirmative defense. 
Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 
1068 (8thCir. 1989); Toner v. Lederle 
Laboratories. 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297, 307 
(1987). These courts have held that there are 
two requirements to establish the comment k 
defense. First, the manufacturer must 
demonstrate that the drug's risk is 
"unavoidable." This is shown by demonstrating 
that, given the current state of knowledge, no 
feasible alternative design exists that would 
accomplish the same purpose with a lesser risk. 
Id. at 306. Next, the manufacturer must 
demonstrate that the overall benefit of the 
drug outweighs the risk created by it. This 
weighing must be done as of the time the 
product is distributed to the plaintiff. Id. 
at 305-306. This balancing test is important 
in that "it does not serve society that an 
unavoidably unsafe product, which has 
occasional or fractious benefit should enjoy 
insulation from strict liability in tort when 
the product's predominant effects are 
detrimental to individual and public safety." 
Willig, the Comment k Character: A Conceptual 
Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 Mercer L.Rev. 
545, 545 (1978). This court holds that comment 
k is an affirmative defense and its 
applicability must be determined by the trial 
8 Judge Greene has also noted that even in Brown the court 
acknowledged and recognized that members of the ALI who drafted 
Sec. 402A and its comments considered and rejected an explicit 
exemption of all prescription drugs from strict liability. 
Memorandum decision and Order attached as Exhibit A to the District 
Courts Certification Order at p.8-9, citing Brown, 751 P.2d at 
475, 38 ALI Proc. 19,90-98 (1961), and Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 
884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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courts on a case-by-case basis• Hill v. Searle 
Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th 
Cir.1989); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732 
P.2d at 303-09. 
Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 400 (footnotes omitted). 
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F.Supp. 233 (D.Utah 
1987), Judge Greene properly predicted the appropriate law of Utah, 
should Comment k be adopted at all, based on the very terms of 
Comment k itself, public policy considerations and the recognition 
that even establishing the applicability of Comment k for a 
particular drug fails to remove the issue of strict liability from 
the case, as limitations on the scope of Comment k immunity are 
"universally recognized." Id. at 236. [citations omitted]. Case 
by case analysis with the burden on the party seeking to insulate 
itself from its recognized liability under law based upon this 
affirmative defense was, and remains, the only appropriate 
resolution. Even proof of Comment k applicability by a defendant, 
however, does not and cannot remove, as a matter of law, potential 
strict liability. 
As held by the court in Hill v. Searle. supra, a product may 
be found to be defective and the manufacturer of a prescription 
drug still subject to strict liability "when it is properly made 
according to an unreasonably dangerous design, or when it is not 
accompanied by adequate instructions and warnings of the dangers 
attending its use." Hill. 884 F.2d at 1067, quoting from Prosser, 
Law of Torts, 659 (4th Ed. 1971) . Upjohn itself also admits that 
Comment k is inapplicable if the product was not properly marketed 
or accompanied by inadequate warnings. (Rec. p.176) The complaint 
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in this action in fact alleges that Halcion was not properly 
marketed as Upjohn concealed and misrepresented data and 
information to the FDA as part of the approval process. (Rec. pp. 9-
10). Yet Upjohn apparently adheres to its contradictory contention 
that strict liability should be stricken from every pharmaceutical 
drug products liability case heretofore brought by any citizen of 
Utah, no matter how dangerous or defective that drug is and 
regardless of whether the drug was properly brought to market at 
all. Clearly, the position espoused by Upjohn is not now, nor 
should it be adopted as, the law of the state of Utah. 
The second of the two purported public policy arguments Upjohn 
asserts as allegedly supporting its contention that the citizens of 
Utah should never again be able to pursue a claim against any 
pharmaceutical manufacturer under the strict liability doctrine 
which is available to Utah citizens in actions against all other 
manufacturers is the unavailability of insurance. Upjohn 
extensively (and irrelevantly) argued before the District Court in 
favor of absolute immunity from strict liability for itself and 
other pharmaceutical manufacturers based upon the alleged 
unavailability of products liability insurance coverage. This 
Court however, has flatly and definitively rejected this 
contention. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1985), not only recognized the public policy interest in 
favor of the consumer, especially with regard to prescription 
drugs, but further held: 
The Utah statute of repose is incapable of 
achieving the avowed purpose of reducing the 
insurance premiums that manufacturers must pay. 
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Product liability insurance premiums for Utah 
manufacturing companies are established on the 
basis of nationwide data, not on a 
manufacturer's experience in Utah. [cite 
omitted] "Although assuring the availability 
of reasonably priced products liability 
insurance is an admirable goal, it will not be 
accomplished or even furthered by limiting 
access to courts in this state where such 
access is seldom sought." 
Id. at 681-2, citing Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of 
Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing Concerns, 1979 
Utah.L.Rev. 149 at 151. This Court also recognized serious public 
safety concerns implicated by granting manufacturers immunity 
through a statute of repose and thereby providing less incentive 
for those very manufacturers who take adequate safety precautions 
and resulting in an increase in "the already substantial number of 
persons who have been injured by shoddy design or workmanship." 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 683. The entire Product Liability Act, codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §§78-15-3 through 6, was declared 
unconstitutional and invalid. Id. at 686.9 
9 Upjohn did not advise the District Court that the entire 
products liability act, including the specific provision asserted 
in its reply memorandum, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6, was declared 
unconstitutional. Subsequent to this Court's decision in Berry, 
the Utah legislature again considered the unconstitutional products 
liability act, repealed specific provisions, including its findings 
regarding insurance coverage availability, amended other sections, 
readopted section 1, but did not reenact Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6. 
Since the Utah legislature deemed it necessary to repeal and re-
enact even portions of the chapter which were not amended, e.g. 
Sec. 1 of 78-15-6, it has apparently determined that Utah Code 
Ann.Sec.78-15-6 should not be the law of Utah. While research 
disclosed no Utah cases on point as to the effect of cited 
amendments to statutes subsequently refining or curing 
unconstitutionality, there is a conflict as to whether such 
amendments are effective at all. See, e.g. , In The Interest of 
RAS, 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34, (1982) (holding that such 
amendments are improper); Valente v. Miles, 93 Idaho 212, 458 P.2d 
84 (Idaho 1969) (contra), and cases collected in 82 C.J.S. statutes 
Sec. 247(b) as well as 16 Am. Jur. Con. Law §258;. As the Utah 
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UpJohn's invocation of Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6(3) not only is 
unavailing but also is directly contrary to the rule that Upjohn 
seeks to have this Court impose. That subsection provides: 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
product is free from any defect or defective 
condition where the alleged defect in the plans 
or designs for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and 
testing the product were in conformity with 
government standards established for that 
industry which were in existence at the time 
the plans or designs for the product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were 
adopted. 
Just as Upjohn implores this Court to ignore the clear 
language of Comment k, Upjohn has ignored the clear and definitive 
terms of this very statute. Without dispute, prior to its 
declaration as unconstitutional, the Utah legislature determined 
that there was only a rebuttable presumption that a product was not 
defective if it in fact fully complied with government standards. 
What Upjohn seeks, however, is the imposition of an irrebuttable 
presumption that upon alleged compliance with FDA regulations, no 
plaintiff may proceed under the doctrine of strict liability and 
prove the defective and unreasonably dangerous character of the 
product. That is directly contrary to the legislature's express 
statement in the statute. Upjohn improperly asserts that 
compliance with FDA regulations relieves it from strict liability 
as a matter of law and that plaintiffs should not be entitled to 
present any evidence whatsoever to the court or to the jury on that 
legislature apparently deemed it necessary to repeal and re-enact 
even those portions which contain no amendment, it seems likely 
that the legislature did not intend to re-enact Section 78-15-6. 
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issue. Upjohn attempts to deprive an injured individual of any 
opportunity to rebut the presumption at all. Clearly, the statute 
evidences the legislature's intent that strict liability remain a 
viable and proper cause of action for the citizens of Utah. If the 
Utah legislature indicated anything in enacting the rebuttable 
presumption statute, it in fact mandated a case by case analysis of 
Comment k, for in rebutting the statutory presumption, plaintiffs 
would have to submit the very evidence going to defect and strict 
liability which Upjohn seeks to exclude. 
A similar attempt to assert a statutory presumption as an 
absolute prohibition against pursuing numerous causes of action 
against a drug manufacturer was directly rejected in Savina v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 913-932 (Kan.1990). Although 
the Kansas statute at issue therein, Kansas Statutes Ann. §60-
3304(a), did not even contain the "rebuttable presumption" 
provisions of the Utah Code, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated 
that at best a manufacturer's compliance with FDA rules and 
regulations under the code section created only a rebuttable 
presumption of the adequacy of any warnings. Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas did not even need to reach the strict liability 
issue of whether the product was defective, as the statute directly 
refuted the manufacturer's claim therein that the statute created 
an irrebutable presumption. The position rejected by Kansas is 
exactly the position Upjohn presses upon this Court in the present 
case. 
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Upjohn has also asserted that the Utah legislature has 
expressed a public policy in favor of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
with the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-18-2 which provides: 
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a 
drug causing the claimant's harm: 
(a) received premarket approval or 
licensure by the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et sea, 
or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 201 et seq.; 
(b) is generally recognized as safe and 
effective under conditions established by the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration and 
applicable regulations, including packaging and 
labeling regulations. 
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive 
damages does not apply if it is shown by clear 
and convincing evidence that the drug 
manufacturer knowingly withheld or 
misrepresented information required to be 
submitted to the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration under its regulations, which 
information was material and relevant to the 
claimant's harm. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-210 (emphasis added) 
First, by its express terms this statute is limited to 
punitive damages. It establishes that the legislature did not deem 
actions for compensatory damages against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to be affected in anyway by FDA approval under this 
code section, a legislative statement directly contrary to the 
fundamental predicate of Upjohn's entire argument, to wit, that a 
cause of action for strict liability, otherwise available to all 
citizens of the state of Utah, should not be permitted against 
10 As the Grundberg cause of action arose on June 19, 1988, and 
since §78-18-2 is not applicable to cases arising before May 1, 
1989, it actually has no bearing on the present action. Upjohn's 
counsel has so represented to the District Court in previous oral 
argument. 
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Upjohn or any other manufacturer of prescription drugs despite the 
fact that the action is seeking compensatory damages. Further, a 
thoughtful analysis of §78-18-2(2) establishes that the legislature 
supports a case by case consideration of potential Comment k 
applicability where there are allegations that a drug has not been 
properly marketed due to a manufacturer's withholding or 
misrepresentation of information required to be submitted to the 
FDA. In such a situation, the legislature has conferred upon the 
citizens of the state of Utah an absolute right to pursue punitive 
damages in order to punish such defendants and to deter further 
misconduct. In fact, it has been noted that if a manufacturer 
falsifies its application to the FDA for drug approval, it cannot 
avoid strict liability. Note, A Prescription For Applying Strict 
Liability; Not All Drugs Deserve Comment k Immunization. 21 
Ariz.St.L.J. 809, 817 n.69 (1989). 
All of the law of Utah, the public policies supporting strict 
liability and decades of precedent dating back even to ultra-
hazardous activities, as recognized by this Court in Hahn, support 
the continued availability of strict liability as a viable 
mechanism for the citizens of this state. Upjohn seeks to have 
this Court, now and forever more, immunize one class of 
manufacturers from that doctrine of strict liability otherwise 
available to the citizens of this state as a means of redressing 
injuries caused by and attributable to all other manufacturers. As 
Judge Greene has found, in accordance with the vast majority of the 
authorities considering Comment k, the "unavoidably unsafe" element 
necessitates consideration of whether a product is made in the 
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safest possible manner and whether its benefits outweigh its 
inherent risks, (Order of Certification at p.5) So long as a 
product can be made safer it is not, by definition, "unavoidably" 
unsafe. Therefore, when a manufacturer fails to show that no safer 
alternatives exist, the majority of courts have refused to apply 
Comment k in obvious recognition that the danger is not 
unavoidable. See, .e.g. , Patten, 676 F.Supp. at 236, as well as 
Toner, supra, Feldman, supra, and the wealth of other authorities 
previously noted discussing the inapplicability of Comment k where 
more suitable alternatives to prescription drugs could be 
available. Similarly, if a product's danger is unnecessary, 
Comment k will not be applied. See, Note, A Prescription For 
Applying Strict Liability, supra at 815, citing Brochu v. Ortho-
Pharmaceutical , 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.1981) (holding that if the 
danger is unnecessary the product is defective regardless of its 
utility) . As Comment k explains, it is only when the danger is 
unavoidable and the utility is great that strict liability may be 
avoided by proper warnings. Avoidably unsafe products deserve no 
protection; yet, clearly, adopting Comment k as a blanket immunity 
for all prescription drugs would do just that. Neither society nor 
this Court should encourage the production of harmful substances 
that can be made safer. See, Note, supra, at pp. 824-825. 
Adoption of the proposed blanket immunity espoused by Upjohn is not 
only contrary to the interests of society in redressing injury but 
further will encourage the manufacturing and marketing of 
ineffective drugs with marginal utility despite the fact that 
Comment k itself mandates an examination of its usefulness and 
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efficacy. Since the benefits of any particular drug, provide the 
fundamental justification for its availability to the market, this 
Court can enhance the safety of such drugs and the accountability 
of drug manufacturers by requiring proof of the usefulness, 
efficacy and beneficial aspects of prescription drugs as a 
precursor to invoking the terms and protection of Comment k. 
The California Supreme Court in Brown failed to explain, ever, 
how the dangers of any new drug can in truth be unavoidable if in 
fact safer alternatives existed, despite having recognized that 
safer alternatives can and do exist. Note, supra at 826. The 
purposes, policies and rationales behind FDA consideration of 
approval of a drug based upon self testing by a manufacturer and 
those policies underlying tort law of the various states which is 
designed to protect and insure not only safety but also 
compensation and right of redress for citizens properly co-exist. 
The former cannot be held to override the latter. Upjohn7s attempt 
to convince this Court otherwise is patently wrong. In rejecting 
blanket immunity for prescription drug manufacturers, Justice 
Huntley, recognizing what pharmaceutical manufacturers sought, was 
compelled to note, in his special concurrence that: 
I fear the day when the State Supreme Court can 
be convinced that an agency, such as the FDA, 
no matter how well intentioned can supplant the 
American Judicial system. 
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732 P.2d 297, 313 (Idaho 1987). 
As the majority recognized in Toner, the California court's 
adoption in Brown of blanket immunity from strict liability for all 
prescription drugs "runs counter both to the express language of 
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Comment k and to common sense. Brown provides no explanation for 
such immunity to all drugs." Toner, 732 P.2d at 309, 310. Brown 
has not been adopted outside the borders of California and is 
uniformly and consistently rejected by the courts considering it. 
It is clear that this Court, on behalf of the citizens of the state 
of Utah, should do likewise. 
Upjohn has repeatedly contended that the "warnings" element of 
strict liability is nothing more than a negligence standard. 
Plaintiffs previous Response Memorandum in Opposition to Upjohn's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment extensively addresses this 
contention and the arguments therein will not be repeated. The 
clear distinctions between a proper consideration of warnings 
claims based upon strict liability versus those based upon 
negligence was clearly and eloquently addressed by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 
429, 479 A. 2d 374 (1984). Therein, the court clearly recognized 
the distinctions between the liability doctrines and the 
appropriate placements of burden of proof arising from those 
distinctions. The court held: 
In strict liability warning cases, unlike 
negligence cases, however, the defendant should 
properly bear the burden of proving that the 
information was not reasonably available or 
obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual 
or constructive knowledge of the defect. Wade 
(1983) supra, at 760-61; see Pollock, 
"Liability of a Blood Bank or Hospital for a 
Hepatitis Associated Blood Transfusion in New 
Jersey" 2 Seton Hall L.Rev. 47, 60 (1970) 
("burden of proof that hepatitis is not 
detectable and unremovable should rest on the 
defendant blood bank or hospital). The 
defendant is in a superior position to know the 
technological material or data in the 
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particular field or specialty. The defendant 
is the expert, often performing self-testing. 
It is the defendant that injected the product 
in the stream of commerce of its economic gain. 
As a matter of policy the burden of proving the 
status of knowledge in the field at the time of 
distribution is properly placed on the 
defendant. [citations omitted] 
, 97 N.J. at , 479 A.2d at 388. This is clearly the appropriate 
ruling for this Court. 
Subquestion B. Whether a Prescription Drug is Unavoidably 
Unsafe is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact 
Which Must be Submitted To and Resolved by 
a Jury Unless Reasonable Minds Could Not 
Differ 
Assuming that this Honorable Court adopts the unavoidably 
unsafe exception to strict products liability as set forth in 
Comment k to Sec. 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
further assuming that this Court adopts that exception as an 
affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the manufacturer on 
a case by case basis, plaintiffs submit that the application of 
that exception to a particular drug is a question of fact 
appropriately resolved by a jury. Plaintiffs submit that such a 
holding would be most consistent with the state of Utah's 
constitutional and statutory law guaranteeing the right of a jury 
trial in civil cases and that it would be in accord with the better 
reasoned decisions on that issue reported in other jurisdictions. 
Utah law guarantees litigants the right of a jury trial in 
civil cases. Utah Const.art.I, §10. 1 See International Harvestor 
11 Article I, §10 provides that: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, 
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight 
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall 
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Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 
(Utah 1981) . "All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, 
other than those mentioned in the next section [§78-21-3]12, are to 
be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed 
to them, except when otherwise provided." Utah Code Ann. §78-21-2. 
[brackets and footnote added]. See also Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 38 and 39. Whether a particular prescription drug is 
"unavoidably unsafe" is a factual question not included in the 
exceptions identified in §78-21-3. Thus, that issue is one 
appropriately submitted to a jury. 
Some courts have concluded that the trial court should hear 
the evidence on the unavoidably unsafe product issue outside the 
presence of the jury and make a determination on that issue based 
thereon. See Johnson v. American Cynamid, 239 Kan. 279, , 718 
P.2d 1318, 1323 (1986); Pollard v. Ashbv. 793 S.W.2d 394, 400 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1990) (en banc). Neither of these courts engaged in a 
significant analysis in concluding that the court rather than the 
jury render a decision on the unavoidably unsafe issue. The court 
in Johnson merely stated that "[p]ublic policy requires that the 
consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall 
be waived unless demanded. 
12 The only exceptions to the requirement in §78-21-2 that a jury 
resolve all factual disputes are identified in §78-21-2, which 
provides that: 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of 
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, the 
construction of statutes and other writings, and the 
application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by 
the court and all discussions of law addressed to it. 
Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law made 
evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such 
knowledge to the jury, who are bound to accept it. 
_*> A — 
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mere manufacture of the [Sabin-type live polio vaccine] not be 
actionable on the ground of design defect." Johnson, 239 Kan. at 
m , 718 P.2d at 1323. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that 
"comment k is an affirmative defense and its applicability must be 
determined by the trial courts on a case by case basis." Pollard, 
793 S.W.2d at 400. See also Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc. , 247 
Kan. 105, , 795 P.2d 915, 926 (1990) (citing Johnson for the 
proposition that the trial judge should hear evidence on the 
unavoidably unsafe product issue outside the presence of the jury 
and make a determination on that issue before submitting the case 
to the jury). The court in Savina likewise failed to analyze the 
"judge" or "jury" issue. However, the court did provide guidance 
as to the factors relevant to determining the unavoidably unsafe 
issue: 
"In our view, the decision as to whether a 
drug, vaccine, or any other product triggers 
unavoidably dangerous product exemption from 
strict liability design defect analysis poses a 
mixed question of law and fact and can be made 
only after evidence is first taken, out of the 
jury's presence, on the relevant factors to be 
considered. [Citations omitted.] A trial 
court should take evidence as to: (1) whether, 
when distributed, the product was intended to 
confer an exceptionally important benefit that 
made its availability highly desirable; (2) 
whether the then-existing risk posed by the 
product was both * substantial7 and 
*unavoidable'; and (3) whether the interest in 
availability (again measured as of the time of 
distribution) outweighs the interest in 
promoting enhanced accountability through 
strict liability design defect review. In 
determining the first aspect of the second 
factor (i.e., whether the risk posed was 
^substantial'), a court should consider 
whether, at the time of distribution, the risk 
posed permanent or long-term disability (e.g., 
loss of body function, organs or death) as 
— *? K — 
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opposed to mere temporary or insignificant 
inconvenience (e.g., skin rash, minor allergic 
reaction, etc.). In determining the second 
aspect of the second factor (i.e., whether the 
risk posed was xunavoidable'), a court should 
consider (i) whether the product was designated 
to minimize-to the extent scientifically 
knowable at the time it was distributed-the 
risk inherent in the product, and (ii) the 
availability-again, at the time of 
distribution-of any alternative product that 
would have as effectively accomplished the full 
intended purpose of the subject product." 172 
Cal.App.3d at 829-30, 218 Cal.Rptr. 453. 
Savina, 247 Kan. at 105, 795 P.2d at 925, quoting Kearl v. Lederle 
Laboratories, 172 Cal.App.3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal.Rptr. 453, 
(1985), overruled in Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 
Cal.Rptr.412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988) (emphasis in original)13 
Despite the opinions discussed above, plaintiffs submit that 
the better reasoned decisions on this issue delegate the 
"unavoidably unsafe" issue to a jury unless reasonable minds could 
not differ. 4 "Comment k's applicability is a mixed question of 
13 The Supreme Court of Kansas expressly rejected Brown and 
concluded that Kearl provided a sound framework for determining a 
whether particular drug was unavoidably unsafe. Savina, 247 Kan. 
at , 795 P. 2d at 926. The court also concluded that the 
appropriate time upon which the analysis should focus is the time 
that the product was distributed and used by the injured 
individual, even though the information had changed since the drug 
was originally introduced into the market. Id. at , 795 P.2d at 
926. 
14 "When reasonable minds could not differ" is akin to stating 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." See Utah 
Rule of Civ.P. 56(c). Seen in that perspective, the issue of 
whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe is a question for the court 
only where there is no genuine issue of any material fact for a 
jury to resolve. In such a situation, the trial court might 
properly consider a motion for summary judgment. See Ulibarri v. 
Christehson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954) (summary judgment 
may be based on an affirmative defense) . But see Rohrbouah by 
Rohrbouah v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 470, 477 
(N.D.W.Va.1989) (whether Comment k applies cannot be a basis for 
summary judgment because its applicability rests on the factual 
issue of whether a safe, equally effective vaccine exists that 
Wyeth could have marketed). The trial court also might strike a 
Comment k affirmative defense upon development of the evidence 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
law and fact." Castrianano v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 
775, 781 (R.I. 1988), citing Toner. 112 Idaho at 333 n.4, 732 P.2d 
at 302 n.4 (1987). M[W]hether Comment k applies is a mixed 
question of fact and law. If reasonable minds could reach only one 
conclusion, then the trial judge may rule; but if reasonable minds 
might differ, then the matter must be submitted to the jury." 
Adams v. G. D. Searle & Co., Inc., 1991 WL 3575 (Fla.App. 
2 Dist. Jan.18, 1991)-, citing Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 782. See 
also, Davila v. Bodelson, 103 N.M. 243, 704 P.2d 1119 
(Ct.App.1985) , cert, denied, 103 N.M. 177, 704 P.2d 431 (1985) . 
Whether Comment k applies to a particular prescription drug is a 
question for the jury based upon the following factors: 
(i) whether the product could have been 
designed in a safer manner; 
(ii) whether a safer alternative product could 
have been made available at the time of 
manufacture and sale to accomplish the 
same intended purpose in questions (sic); 
and 
(iii)whether the benefits of the product 
outweigh the interest in promoting 
enhanced accountability on the part of the 
manufacturer. 
Kociemba v. G.D.Searle & Co., 695 F.Supp. 432, 433 (D.Minn.1988) ;, 
citing the district court's earlier opinion at 680 F.Supp. 1293, 
where it becomes clear that such a defense is not available in 
light of the proofs developed at trial. See Graham v. Wveth 
Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir.1990). In Graham, the 
district court struck Wveth's §402A Comment k defense and denied 
its motion for summary judgment based thereon at a hearing during 
trial. The district court found that a material dispute of fact 
precluded a determination on the unavoidably unsafe issue at the 
summary judgment stage. The court submitted the issue of "design 
defect" to the jury. The "jury's affirmative answer to 
interrogatory 4 ("design defect") must be read as a jury finding 
that Wyeth's vaccine was "avoidably," and not "unavoidably," unsafe 
" Id. at 1406-07. 
-17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1301 (D.Minn. 1988), and Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 
676 F.Supp. 233 (D.Utah 1987) . 
Though declining to decide the issue in the case before it, 
the Supreme Court of Idaho summarized the conflicting positions on 
the issue of whether a judge or the jury should decide the 
unavoidably unsafe product issue: 
The instant case does not present this 
issue of whether the judge or the jury ought to 
determine the application of comment k to a 
particular product. Some courts and 
commentators, emphasizing the factual 
determinations necessary, leave it to the jury. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 772 P.2d 
410, 416 (Colo.1986); Willig, supra, 29 Mercer 
L.Rev. at 579; W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 
(4th ed.1971) ("When any evidence can be 
produced that [the risk] might have been 
avoided, [strict liability] becomes a question 
for the jury, and may lead to liability." 
(footnote omitted.)) Others, concerned with 
the policy implications of the decision, would 
have the court decide comment k's application 
as a matter of law. Johnson v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan.279, 718 P.2d 1318, 1323-
24 (1986); Schwartz, supra, 42 Wash. & Lee 
L.Rev. at 1147-48; Wade, supra, 44 Miss.L.J. at 
838,844. 
Either way the decision of the 
applicability of comment k pertains only to 
claims based on defective design, and not to 
those based on defective manufacture or 
inadequate warning. The latter two raise 
questions of fact to be decided by the jury. 
Sliman, supra, 112 Idaho at 281, 731 P.2d at 
1271 (on adequacy of warning) ; Farmer v. 
International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 748-
49, 553 P.2d 1306, 1312-13 (1976) (on defective 
manufacturer). 
Toner, 112 Idaho at 328 n.9, 732 P.2d at 297, 308-09 n.9 (Idaho 
1987) . 
Comment k sets out a risk benefit test for ascertaining 
whether a prescription drug or any other product is unavoidably 
unsafe and therefore whether the manufacturer of such product is 
-38-
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shielded from strict liability for injuries resulting from the use 
of same. See Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 780. To demonstrate which 
types of drugs should be excluded from strict liability analysis, 
the authors of Restatement Section 402A and Comment k provided that 
such an exemption should apply to drugs "whose harmful side effects 
are known but whose benefits far outweigh the known risks." 
Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 780. Comment k specifically identifies 
the Pasteur rabies vaccine as the type of drug whose benefits far 
outweigh its known risks. Seizing upon the example in the comment, 
courts faced with allegations that a manufacturer is strictly 
liable for injuries resulting from the use of vaccines have applied 
the Comment k exception. See, e.g., Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F.Supp. 
1473, 1476 (W.D.Ky.1990), and cases cited therein. But see Ackley 
v. Wveth Laboratories, Inc., 919 F.2d 397, 400 (6th Cir.1990) 
(concluding that under Ohio law the issue of whether the DPT 
vaccine is unavoidably unsafe is determined on a case by case 
analysis) and Patten supra. Similarly, courts have found blood and 
blood products to be unavoidably unsafe, after proper analysis of 
the Comment k factors, primarily due to such products life-
sustaining and life saving characteristics. See Miles Laboratories 
v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1117 (Md.1989), and cases cited therein.15 
15 Applying Comment k immunity to prescription blood products 
finds support in Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective 
Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965). 
Justice Traynor, who wrote the seminal opinion adopting strict 
liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 
2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), identified blood 
products as a classic example of unavoidably unsafe products. 
Thus, the nearly blanket immunity from strict tort liability 
received by blood and blood products arguably reflects the 
influence of Justice Traynor. 
-'IQ. 
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Other prescription drugs do not fit so neatly into the 
category of unavoidably unsafe drugs. Their utility is not so 
clearly superior to other drugs in light of their attendant risks. 
Whether the benefits afforded by drugs other than rabies vaccine 
and blood products, outweigh the risks associated with their use 
and the availability of other safer products is a fact specific 
determination traditionally reserved to a jury. Plaintiffs submit 
that this Honorable Court should so conclude.16 
C. Evidence Pertaining To All Risks And 
Benefits From Any Drug Seeking Comment k 
Protection. As Well As Such Evidence 
Pertaining To Alternatives, Are Necessary 
For A Proper And Complete Consideration Of 
Comment k's Potential Applicability 
Proper application of Comment k clearly requires a weighing of 
the benefits of a product against its risks and considers only 
products which cannot be designed more safely. The evidence must 
address whether the risk is "unavoidable" as whether the product is 
incapable of being made safe for its ordinary and intended usages, 
which clearly implicates whether the design is as safe as the best 
available testing and research permits. Further, the element of 
"unavoidable risks" requires that there exists no feasible 
16 In considering the constitutionality of a statutory cap on 
damages, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that such a cap 
would impermissibly interfere with the constitutional rights of 
access to courts and right to a jury trial. Smith v. Department of 
Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla.1987). Limiting recovery 
to a particular amount results in denying an injured party the 
constitutional right to be redressed for those injuries. 
Similarly, denying an injured party the right to have a jury 
consider the merits of a cause of action denies that individual his 
or her right as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution to have a jury 
consider and resolve factual disputes about that cause of action. 
Whether a product is unavoidably unsafe requires a factual inquiry. 
Factual inquiries are precisely the function traditionally 
preserved for juries. 
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alternative design which on balance accomplishes the subject drug's 
purpose with lesser risk. Toner v. Lederle Labs, supra, 732 P.2d 
at 305-306. (cites omitted). As recognized by the court in Toner, 
if such a feasible alternative design existed,then the risk 
obviously is not unavoidable or "apparently reasonable"; "[n]or 
would the ^marketing and use of the [product] be fully justified'. 
Consequently, Comment k by definition would not apply." 732 P.2d 
at 306. The issue then becomes what does the trier of fact 
consider in making those determinations. 
The courts applying comment k on a case by case basis 
uniformly apply most if not all of the factors enunciated in Kearl 
v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal.App.3d 812, 218 Cal.Rptr. 453 
(1985), overruled. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 
(Calif.1988). The court should take evidence as to: 
(1) whether, when distributed, [footnote 
omitted] the product was intended to confer an 
exceptionally important benefit that made its 
availability highly desirable; (2) whether 
the then-existing risk posed by the product 
both was "substantial" and "unavoidable"; and 
(3) whether the interest and availability 
(again measured as of the time of distribution) 
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced 
accountability through strict liability design 
defect review. In determining the first aspect 
of the second factor (i.e., whether the risk 
posed was "substantial") a court should 
consider whether, at the time of distribution, 
the risk posed permanent or long-term 
disability (e.g. loss of bodily functions, 
organs or death) as opposed to mere temporary 
or insignificant inconvenience (e.g., skin 
rash, minor allergic reaction, etc.). In 
determining the second aspect of the second 
factor (i.e., whether the risk posed was 
"unavoidable") a court should consider 
(i)whether the product was designed to minimize 
- to the extent scientifically knowable at the 
time it was distributed - the risk inherent in 
-41-
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the product, and (ii) the availability - again, 
at the time of distribution - of any 
alternative product that would have as 
effectively accomplished full intended purpose 
of the subject product. 
Kearl, 172 Cal.App.3d at , 218 Cal.Rptr.at 464, (emphasis in 
original). As further notfcd by the court in Toner, the evaluation 
of alternative designs, as well as the subject drug's design, 
should consider magnitude of the risk that the alternative product 
avoids as well as the financial costs of the compared designs, the 
benefits of the compared designs, and the relative safety of the 
compared designs, including any new risks that the alternative 
would pose. Toner, 732 P.2d at 306* 
Obviously, for adequate and proper consideration of whether 
the defendant has met its affirmative burdens of proof and 
persuasion with regard to the applicability of Comment k, an 
analysis of all risks incident to the use of the subject drug must 
be considered. In fact, as analysis of the potential risks of the 
proposed alternative (which obviously are not at issue in the case 
in chief) must of necessity be considered by the trier of fact in 
balancing the evidence, any contrary holding would not only prevent 
consideration of the relevant crucial evidence, but would further 
permit the subject drug manufacturer to unfairly tip the scales in 
favor of its product by urging numerous risks involved with the 
proposed alternative while at the same time ignoring and avoiding 
all counter balancing evidence of risks of its product. If there 
is truly to be a comparison, due process and its fundamental 
notions of fairness require that the alternatives presented to the 
trier of fact be on the same footing. 
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The presentation of such evidence during the trial of the 
action is clearly the appropriate and permissible method to allow 
consideration of the affirmative defense of Comment k. As held in 
Graham v. Wveth Labs. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.1990), cert, denied 
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 511 (1990), the district court's refusal to 
hold a "mini-trial" (as contemplated by Kearl, supra,) outside the 
presence of the jury constituted no abuse of discretion. First, 
the court noted that mini-trials can often result in "undue delay, 
waste of time and needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
Graham, 906 F.2d at 1406 n.10, citing Moe v. Avions & Arcel, 727 
F.2d 917, 935 (10th Cir.1987). Second, as negligent design defect 
claims are not barred by even proven Comment k applicability, the 
same evidence, of necessity, will be considered by the jury. "In a 
case where both theories of strict liability and negligence are 
alleged, the evidence from which the court must determine if the 
product is unavoidably unsafe need not be heard outside the 
presence of the jury as it will be the same evidence from which the 
jury will determine negligence." Graham, 906 F.2d at 1406, citing 
Judge Kelly's opinion in the case below, 666 F.Supp at 1498. 
Finally, all of the evidence regarding any potential adverse 
reactions, propensities, risks and dangers of a prescription drug 
or other product were recognized by the Utah legislature to 
constitute appropriate, proper and admissible evidence under the 
very statute previously argued by Upjohn. Utah Code Ann. §78-15-
6(2) defines "unreasonably dangerous" to mean: "that the product 
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by 
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in 
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the community considering a product's characteristics, 
propensities, risks, dangers and uses .... " (emphasis added). 
Defect and unreasonably dangerous character have always been co-
existent elements of strict liability actions, and the unreasonably 
dangerous character of a product is separate and distinct from the 
consideration of the defect proximately resulting in the injury to 
the plaintiff. This has been recognized by the Utah legislature as 
well as by the court in Pollard v. Ashbv, supra. In the latter, 
the defendant drug manufacturer asserted reversible error in 
plaintiff's expert witness testifying about a potential danger of 
the drug which was not the injury alleged by the plaintiff. In 
affirming, the court held: 
[T]o prove the claim of strict liability 
product defect, it was incumbent upon the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate, not only that 
chymodiactin caused his injuries, but also that 
it was "unreasonably dangerous when put to a 
reasonably anticipated use." [cite omitted] 
The testimony of Dr. Sussman was relevant to 
this point and was likely to be of help to the 
jury. Thus, there was no error. [cites 
omitted] 
Pollard, 793 S.W.2d at 401. 
17 In Wolf bv Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F.Supp 613 (D.N.J. 
1982) , the plaintiff had offered evidence reflecting other 
"problems" with Rely tampons as evidencing only notice, knowledge 
and reckless disregard. The court neither mentioned nor considered 
the admissibility of such evidence under the required showing of a 
products "unreasonably dangerous" character. The Wolf decision has 
not been followed for that proposition in any published opinion to 
date. Moreover, the very evidence excluded by the court in Wolf 
was admitted in another TSS trial, and no error was found. Kehmn 
v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.. 724 F.2d 613, 625-26 (8th Cir.1983) 
Kehm has been followed, even in California. West v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 220 Cal.Rptr. 437, 174 Cal.App.3d 831, 59 A.L.R.4th 1 
(1985), rev, denied (1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 824, 107 S.Ct. 
96, 93 L.Ed.2d 47 (1986) (rejecting Wolf and following Kehm). 
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Clearly, such evidence is admissible in strict products 
liability actions, and the need, propriety and admissibility of 
such evidence is especially clear in the present case, which 
involves a pharmacologically active substance designed and intended 
to alter and operate upon the central nervous system of the user, 
wherein it is alleged that such drug induces a spectrum of central 
nervous system disorders, manifested by a range of psychological 
and psychiatric reactions from depression and depersonalization 
through psychosis, aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal 
compulsion. Such evidence is admissible at the trial of this 
action not only on plaintiffs' strict liability claim but also on 
all negligence claims and will be considered by the jury during the 
trial of this case. Clearly, that trier of fact should not be 
instructed to disregard such evidence in its consideration of 
whether Upjohn has properly sustained its burdens of proof and 
persuasion and whether Upjohn has established that it is entitled 
to a charge on its pleaded affirmative defense, i.e., the 
unavoidably unsafe product exception to the law of strict tort 
liability.
 2 
CONCLUSION 
The clear public interest of the citizens of the state of Utah 
favor enhanced accountability of product manufacturers not only for 
increased safety concerns but also for the proper allocation of the 
costs of defective products upon those who inject such products 
into commerce for economic gain. Adoption of Comment k to Section 
402A runs directly contrary to those public policies. 
-4R-
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If adopted, this Court should join with the vast majority and 
better reasoned authorities establishing that a potential Comment k 
protection is an affirmative defense to be proven by the party 
seeking its protection on a case by case basis. Blanket and 
absolute immunity as sought by Upjohn is contrary to the very terms 
of Comment k, as well as to common sense. For Upjohn to further 
assert that strict liability should be eliminated in the state of 
Utah for all prescription drug manufacturers based upon FDA 
regulations is contrary to all authority, including that which 
Upjohn urges this Court to adopt. The safety, rights and remedies 
of the citizens of the state of Utah should not be stripped from 
them and deposited within the exclusive domain of an agency of the 
United States government. 
Proper application of Comment k necessitates extensive factual 
determinations which are constitutionally and statutorily placed 
within the domain of Utah citizens sitting on a jury. In 
considering those appropriate factors, the jury will of necessity 
hear the appropriate evidence regarding the Comment k affirmative 
defense as part of the negligent design action,and it is clear that 
the jury's decision on the affirmative defense of Comment k should 
be based upon all relevant evidence. To exclude any such evidence 
would not only result in potential confusion but may well deprive 
the appellate courts of the actual evidence necessary to properly 
consider the acceptance or rejection of the affirmative defense in 
any case. It is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
uphold, fully, the rights of the citizens of the state of Utah by, 
if not rejecting Comment k in its entirety, applying that Comment 
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as its terms dictate and a 
requires. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually, 
and JANICE GRAY, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of Mildred Lucille Coats, 
Deceased, 'CERTIFICATION ORDER 
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Plaintiffs, 
U.S. District Court 
VS. Civil No. 89-C-274G 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this court acting sua sponte requests the Honorable 
Supreme Court of Utah to answer the question of law certified 
herein. As more particularly set forth below, the question 
certified is a controlling question of law in the above entitled 
case, and moreover, it involves a significant public policy 
issue. The United States District Court which is certifying this 
question has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this 
case, and the law of the State of Utah is the law to be applied. 
The courts of the State of Utah, including the Utah Supreme 
Court, have not previously addressed this question. It is 
believed that the question certified will not unduly interfere 
with the Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be 
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development of the 
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decisional law of the State. In accordance with the said Rule 
41, the following matters are set forth as part of this 
Certification Order* 
1. The question of law to be answered: Whether Utah 
adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products11 exception to strict 
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?1 
1
 Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides: 
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products* 
There are some products which, in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable 
of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use. These are especially common in 
the field of drugs. An outstanding example 
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of 
rabies# which not uncommonly leads to very 
serious and damaging consequences when it is 
injected. Since the disease itself 
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both 
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are 
fully justified, notwithstanding the 
unavoidable high degree of risk which they 
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, 
"" and accompanied by proper directions and 
warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot 
legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician. It is 
also true in particular of many new or 
experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
medical experience, there can be no assurance 
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of 
ingredients, but such experience as there is 
justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable 
risk. The seller of such products, again 
with the qualification that they are properly 
2 
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Subouestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, 
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of 
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to 
the Comment k exception, or should that determination be made on 
a case by case basis? 
Subouestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and 
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved 
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is 
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a 
question properly to be presented to the jury? 
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k 
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by 
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from 
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally 
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe" 
determination? 
2. The question certified is a controlling issue of 
law in a case pending before the certifying court, the United 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is 
given, where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, 
merely because he has undertaken to supply 
the public with an apparently useful and 
desirable product, attended with a known but 
apparently reasonable risk. 
3 
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States District Court for the District of Utah, entitled, * 
Grundberg v. UpJohn Co.. Civil No. 89-C-274 (assigned to Hon. J. 
Thomas Greene). The question certified arises in the context of 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by defendant Upjohn that 
has been fully briefed and argued and is currently under 
advisement by the certifying court. Attached as Exhibit A to 
this Certification Order is the Memorandum Decision and Order of 
the certifying court which addresses related Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
3. There appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 
1979). However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of 
prescription drugs or otherwise. 
In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court considered a drug product 
liability case, but the court found that it was not necessary to 
reach the strict liability issue because the court found that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the juryfs verdict on 
the negligence claim. Id. at 837. Also, certain Utah statues 
address the liability of product and drug manufacturers, but 
these statutes do not directly address these Comment k issues. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-6(3)(1987) (rebuttable presumption 
that product was not defective if manufactured according to 
4 
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industry standards); 78-18-2 (1990 Supp.) (punitive damages-
unavailable if drug was approved by FDA). 
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories. 676 F.Supp. 233 (D. 
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine# the certifying court 
predicted that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment 
k if given the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k 
is the law of Utah to be applied. Id. at 235. The court in 
Patten specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn 
urges here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe" element to 
Comment k immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs 
should be determined on a case by case basis. 
The "unavoidably unsafe" element of Comment k is that 
the product in question is made in the safest possible manner and 
that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks. In its pending 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that 
factual disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe 
requirement; rather# Upjohn takes the position that Halcion, like 
all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite as 
a matter of law. 
Defendant Upjohn argues that the courtfs holding in 
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 
(Cal. 1988), which held that for reasons of public policy, all 
FDA approved prescription drugs satisfy the Comment k unavoidably 
unsafe requirement as a matter of law. Plaintiffs, on the other 
5 
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hand# urge that the Patten decision is still in accord with'the 
better position; i.e.. that a case by case determination should 
be made regarding the unavoidably unsafe Comment k requirement. 
Both parties agree that the other prerequisite for the 
Comment k defense, that the drug "was properly prepared and 
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities/1 must be 
established by the drug manufacturer in each case. 
3. States are divided on the question certified. 
States are divided on the question of whether 
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as 
a matter of law or whether this determination should be made on a 
case by case basis (subquestion A certified). See generally. 
Annotation,"Products Liability: What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe" 
Product, 70 A.L.R.4th 16, 41-47 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Courts 
supporting the view that all FDA approved prescription drugs are 
"unavoidably unsafe" as a matter of law include: Lindsay v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F*2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
New York law); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D. 
S.D. 1983), affd. 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Fellows v. USV 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Brown v. 
Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Kirk v. Michael Reese 
HOSP. & Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987); McKee v. 
Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. 
Chapman. 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53^ (Ind. App. 1979); Leibowitz v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (Pa. Super. 
6 
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1973). 
Courts following the view that the Comment k 
^'unavoidably unsafe" requirement should be made on a case by case 
basis with regard to prescription drugs include: Graham v. Wyeth 
Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g, €66 F.Supp. 
1483 (D. Kan, 1987) (applying Kansas law); Hill v. Searle 
Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas 
law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st -
Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 680. F.Supp. 1293, modified, 695 F.Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988); 
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Feldman 
v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); White v. Wveth 
Laboratories. Inc.. 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrincmano v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.. 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v. 
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326# 340 (Ariz. App. 1978). See also Note, A 
Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not all Drugs Deserve 
Comment K Immunization, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989). 
There is also an apparent split of authority as to 
whether the Comment k defense is a court or jury question 
(subquestion B certified). See id.
 f 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at 819-20. 
4. Facts relevant to the determination of the Question 
certified: 
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred 
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff 
7 
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on June 19, 1988. The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the* 
personal representative of Ms* Coats1 estate. Plaintiffs allege 
in their Complaint that Ms. Gnxndberg shot her mother as a direct 
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, which 
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn. Halcion 
is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by 
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings, 
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade 
name of the drug "triazolam" (generic name). 
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world 
market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a 
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (,fFDAw) to market triazolam (Halcion) in the 
United States. The FDA approved Upjohn1s Halcion application on 
November 15, 1982. Since that time, defendant Upjohn has 
manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and 
physicians for dispensation by prescription only. In 1988 
Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and 
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations 
around the world. 
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5 
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother, 
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was 
consistent with UpJohn1s recommended dosage. Plaintiffs allege 
that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion 
8 
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(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many 
side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization, 
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion• 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action, 
including Common Law Negligence (Count I), and Strict Liability 
(Count II),2 In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege 
that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion 
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff Gnindberg • Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did 
not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect 
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),3 and willfully, recklessly, and/or 
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions, 
warnings and advice" regarding such side effects to plaintiff 
Grundbergfs physician.4 Complaint 55 B.VIII, D.I., E.V. 
2
 Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count HI, Breach of Expressed 
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are 
damage claims, 
3
 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that 
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a "manufacturing 
defect" occurred, ie. , that plaintiff Gnindberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that 
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that 
were taken by plaintiff Gnindberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to 
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
A
 Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to 
plaintiff Gnindberg, plaintiff Grundberg's family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists. 
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant, 
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs* failure to warn claims except as they pertain to plaintiff 
9 
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by 
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and 
dangerous and was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff 
Grundbergfs motherr Mildred Lucille Coats* 
5. Additional Reasons for Acceptance of this 
Certification Order: The question and subquestions presented are 
of major importance in products liability actions against drug 
manufacturers• The issues presented are matters of first 
impression to the Utah Supreme Court and they are likely to recur 
repeatedly in federal courts applying Utah law and in state court 
proceedings also. In terms of comity, this court believes that 
the Supreme Court of Utah should be given the opportunity to 
decide this matter of Utah law rather than having this court 
address the matter in this diversity of citizenship case and 
render an "Eirie guess." 
A six week jury trial in this case is scheduled to 
commence on April 29, 1991. 
The necessary briefing relative to this matter has 
already been done by counsel, and it is believed that counsel for 
the parties would be in a position to stipulate to an accelerated 
briefing schedule and presentation of arguments before the court. 
Grandbergfs physician. See Order of March 11,1990, issued by Honorable Judge David K. 
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the "learned 
intermediary doctrine" under Utah law. See Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 
835 (Utah 1984). 
10 
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This court respectfully requests, if the Honorable 
Supreme of Utah exercises its discretion to accept the question 
herewith certified, that the court set forth in its order of 
acceptance an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs and for 
oral argument as contemplated in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
DATED: December _[3_* 1990-
4 
yf THOMAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
^k^ft^^utg^ 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually, 
and JANICE GRAY, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of Mildred Lucille Coats, 
Deceased, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
- AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No. 89-C-274G 
vs. 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly on August 28, 1990 for 
hearing on various motions of the defendant, the Upjohn Company 
("Upjohn"). After extensive briefing by the parties and a day of 
oral argument, the court took three motions under advisement: (1) 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 
Strict Liability Claim; (2) Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Failure to Warn Claims; and (3) 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ian 
Oswald, M.D. Now, being fully advised, the court sets forth its 
Memorandum Decision and Order with respect to these three pending 
motions. 
FACTUAL PAOygftOWP 
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred 
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff 
on June 19, 1988. The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the 
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personal representative of Ms. Coats1 estate. Plaintiffs allege 
in their Complaint that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother as a direct 
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, which 
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn. Halcion 
is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by 
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings, 
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade 
name of the drug "triazolam" (generic name). 
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world 
market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a 
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA") to market triazolam (Halcion) in the 
United States. The FDA approved Upjohnfs Halcion application on 
November 15, 1982. Since that time, defendant Upjohn has 
manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and 
physicians for dispensation by prescription only. In 1988 c 
Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and 
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations 
around the world. 
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5 
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother, 
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was 
consistent with UpJohn1s recommended dosage. Plaintiffs allege 
that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion 
(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many 
2 
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side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization, 
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action, 
but only the first two claims, Common Law Negligence (Count I) 
and Strict Liability (Count II), are involved in the pending 
motions.1 In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege 
that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion 
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff Grundberg. Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did 
not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect 
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),2 and willfully, recklessly, and/or 
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions, 
warnings and advice" regarding such side effects to plaintiff 
Grundberg's physician.3 Complaint J5 B.VIII, D.I., E.V. 
1
 Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count III, Breach of Expressed 
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are 
damage claims. 
2
 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that 
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a "manufacturing 
defect" occurred, Le., that plaintiff Grundberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that 
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that 
were taken by plaintiff Grundberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to 
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from 
plaintiffs* Complaint 
3
 Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to 
plaintiff Grundberg, plaintiff Grundbergfs family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists. 
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant, 
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs' failure to warn claims except as they pertain to plaintiff 
3 
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by 
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and 
dangerous and was a proximate cause of the death of plaintiff 
Grundberg's mother, Mildred Lucille Coats. 
DISCUSSION „:r..o^ 
I. Strict Liability Claim 
A. Overview 
Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs1 Strict Liability Claim requires consideration of the 
application in Utah of Comment k to Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The specific issue presented in 
defendant's motion is whether Halcion, as a prescription drug 
approved by the FDA, should be deemed to have satisfied all the 
prerequisites for the "unavoidably unsafe" exception to strict 
liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the 
Restatement. Section 402A,and the Comment k exception state as 
follows: 
Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of 
Product for Physical Harm to User or 
Grundberg's physician. See Order of March 11,1990, issued by the Honorable Judge David K. 
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the Earned 
intermediary doctrine" under Utah law. See Barson v. E.R. Sauibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 
835 (Utah 1984). 
4 
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Consumer.4 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the 
business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies 
although 
(a) the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought 
the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). 
. * * * '
: 
Comment_k. Unavoidably unsafe products. 
There are some products which, in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable 
of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use. These are especially common in 
the field of drugs. An outstanding example 
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of 
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very 
serious and damaging consequences when it is 
injected. Since the disease itself 
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both 
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are 
fully justified, notwithstanding the 
4
 Strict liability, as stated in Section 402A, applies only to users or consumers of 
products. The Reporters "Caveat" to Section 402A states: "The Institute expresses no opinion as 
to. whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than 
users or consumers...." Plaintiffs' Complaint ostensibly seeks recovery tinder strict liability for 
both users (Ms. Grundberg) and nonusers of Halcion (Ms. Coats). Complaint I E.V. However, 
the scope of Section 402A is not an issue in defendant's strict liability motion. 
5 
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unavoidable high degree of risk which they 
involve• Such a product, properly prepared, 
and accompanied by proper directions and 
warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot 
legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician. It is 
also true in particular of many new or 
experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
medical experience, there can be no assurance 
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of 
ingredients, but such experience as there is 
justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable 
risk. The seller of such products, again 
with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is 
. given, where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, 
merely because he has undertaken to supply 
the public with an apparently useful and 
desirable product, attended with a known but 
apparently reasonable risk. 
Restatement (Second^ of Torts § 402A, Comment k (1965). 
In this diversity jurisdiction case the substantive law 
of Utah applies. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 
1979. See Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 
1979) . However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F.Supp. 233 (D. 
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine, this court stated 
that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment k if given 
the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k is the law 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of Utah to be applied* Id. at 235* The court in Patten 
specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn urges 
here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe" element to Comment k 
immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs should be 
determined on a case by case basis:5 
Some courts have taken the view that 
Comment K applies to all design defect claims 
involving prescription drugs as a matter of 
law. See, e.g.. Brown. 227 Cal.Rptr. at 772, 
774; cf. Johnson. 718 P.2d at 1323. However, 
as this court sees it, comment k does not 
provide blanket immunity to all prescription 
drugs. The language of the comment indicates 
it is to apply to only "some" products. . . . 
Prescription drugs are not necessarily so 
designed that they cannot currently be made 
safer, and sometimes there are more suitable 
alternatives. Also, the benefits of 
particular drugs do not necessarily outweigh 
their discovered risks in every instance. 
See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 655; Singer v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, at 290-91 
(1972). The court considers that extending 
a comment k protection to an entire class of 
products would be unwise in light of the 
requirements comment k specifies as 
prerequisite to its application. 
Id. at 236-37. i. 
Defendant Upjohn argues that the court's holding in 
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California 
Supreme Court case Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 
5
 In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that no factual 
disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe requirement fie, that Halcion is made in 
the safest possible manner and that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks). Rather, Upjohn 
takes the position that Halcion, like all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite 
as a matter of law. 
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1988) , which held that for reasons of public policy, all FDA 
approved prescription drugs are not subject to strict liability 
as a matter of law. However, in Patten. this court specifically 
considered and rejected the California Court of Appeals decision 
which the California Supreme Court affirmed in Brown. 676 
F.Supp. at 236. 
B. Comment k and the "Unavoidably Unsafe11 Requirement 
States are divided on the question of whether 
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as 
a matter of law or whether this determination should be made on a 
case by case basis. See generally. Annotation, Products 
Liability: What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe" Product, 70 A.L.R.4th 
16, 41-47 (1989 & Supp. 1990). The Brown decision of the 
California Supreme Court appears to be the leading case in 
support of the view that all prescription drugs are "unavoidably 
unsafe" as a matter of law. See also Lindsay v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
New York law): McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D. 
S.D. 1983), aff*d. 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Fellows v. USV 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Kirk v. 
Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111. 
1987); McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541# 544-53 (Ind. 
App. 1979); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d 
449, 457-59 (Pa. Super. 1973). But even in Brown, the California 
8 
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court acknowledged that members of the American Law Institute who 
drafted Section 402A and its accompanying comments considered and 
rejected language which explicitly exempted all prescription 
drugs from strict liability. 751 P.2d at 475, citing 38 ALI 
Proc. 19, 90-98 (1961); see also Hill v. Searle Laboratories. 884 
F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989). Courts that follow the view 
that all prescription drugs are "unavoidably unsafe" as a matter 
of law recognize that prescription drug manufacturers still have 
the burden of establishing that the drug "was properly prepared 
and accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities11 in 
order to be immune from strict liability. See e.g. Brown. 751 
P.2d at 482-83. 
The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the Comment k 
••unavoidably unsafe" exemption in relation to prescription drugs 
in Graham v. Wveth Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), 
aff•q, 666 F.Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987). Similar to this court's 
Patten case, Graham involved a strict liability claim against a 
DPT vaccine manufacturer. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district 
court^s interpretation that Kansas law required a case by case 
showing by the drug manufacturer that the drug was "unavoidably 
unsafe" in order for the manufacturer to be entitled to Comment k 
protection from strict liability. 906 F.2d at 1405-06. Other 
court decisions following the case by case approach include Hill 
v. Searle Laboratories. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989)(applying 
Arkansas law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 642 F.2d 652 
9 
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(1st Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G«D. Searle 
i Co., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 680 F.Supp. 1293, modified, 695 F.Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988); 
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Feldman 
v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); White v. Wveth 
Laboratories. Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrinanano v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v. 
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. App. 1978). See also Note, & 
Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not all Drugs Deserve 
Comment K Immunization, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989). 
C. Certification to Utah Supreme Court 
In the absence of specific direction from the Utah 
Supreme Court on this issue since this court's Patten decision, 
this court would be reluctant to overturn that decision, which 
held that the Comment k exception to strict liability under 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the law of 
Utah to be applied, and that whether a prescription drug product 
is "unavoidably unsafe11 should be determined on a case by case 
basis. However, the court recognizes that this issue is a 
controlling question of law in this case, and moreover, it 
involves a significant public policy issue. States around the 
country are not in agreement on this issue, and in this diversity 
jurisdiction case where the law of Utah is to be applied, the 
Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to address this issue. 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court has 
10 
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determined, sua sponte, to exercise its discretion in certifying 
this issue to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule -41 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See generally Lehman Bros, v. 
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)(under appropriate circumstances 
federal courts should exercise their discretion to certify 
questions of law to state tribunal); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. 
Co.. 764 F.2d 876, 883-84 (D.C.Cir. 1985)(same). Accordingly, an 
Order of Certification is promulgated contemporaneously with this 
Memorandum Decision and Order.6 
II. Failure to Warn and Inadequate Warning Claims 
A. Overview 
Courts, commentators, and the parties in this case 
appear to be in agreement that the adequacy of Upjohn%s warnings 
6
 The question certified is as follows: Whether Utah 
adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception to strict 
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)? 
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, 
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of 
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to 
the comment k exception, or should that determination be made on 
a case by case basis? 
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and 
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved 
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is 
such determination a threshold question for the trial court or a 
question properly to be presented to the jury? 
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k 
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by 
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from 
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally 
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe" 
determination? 
11 
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is decided on a negligence standard, even though this issue is 
part of plaintiffs1 claim for strict liability as well as in 
their claim for negligence.7 In other words, Upjohn had a duty 
to warn physicians of adverse side-effects from taking Halcion 
which Upjohn knew of or should have known at the time the drug 
was manufactured and distributed.8 Courts have recognized that 
a drug manufacturer's warning may be inadequate because of "its 
factual content, its expression of the facts# or the method or 
form in which it is conveyed." Williams v. Lederle Laboratories. 
591 F.Supp. 381, 384 (S.D. Ohio 1984), quoting Selev v. G.D. 
Searle & Co. . 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981). gee also Petty v. 
United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1437 (8th Cir. 1984); Salmon v. 
Parke. Davis & Co.. 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); McEwen 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical. 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974). The 
court1s opinion herein pertains to all of plaintiffs warning 
claims, both under the negligence cause of action and the strict 
liability cause of action—except as to the warning issues 
involved in defendant Comment k defense to strict liability, 
which is a subject within the question certified to the Utah 
7
 See generally Patten v. Lederle Laboratories. 676 F.Supp. 
233, 236 note 8 (D. Utah 1987); Werner v. Uoiohn Co.. 628 F.2d 
848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); 
Johnson v. American Cyanamid. 718 P.2d 1318# 1324 (Kan. 1986); 
Henderson & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: 
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 265 (1990). 
8
 See generally Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc., 682 
P.2d 832, 835-36 (Utah 1989); Restatement (Second^ of Torts § 
402A# Comment j (1965). 
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Supreme Court. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Plaintiffs1 Failure to Warn Claims seeks to limit the scope of 
the evidence and issues at trial regarding plaintiffs1 warning 
claims. 
Defendant Upjohn argues that in this case the only 
relevant evidence with regard to the adequacy of its warnings is 
limited to those side effects which plaintiff Grundberg allegedly 
suffered after taking Halcion and to which no warnings or 
allegedly inadequate warnings were given. In this regard, Upjohn 
argues that adverse side effects which plaintiff Grundberg does 
not allege to have suffered, and side-effects as to which 
adequate warnings are undisputed, are irrelevant in this case and 
that it would be unfairly prejudicial to have the jury consider 
such evidence. 
Plaintiffs oppose Upjohnfs motion by arguing that (1) 
proper application of the learned intermediary doctrine and 
"other legal and scientific principles11 imposes a duty upon 
Upjohn to provide adequate warnings about all adverse side 
effects of Halcion which it knows or has reason to know; and (2) 
questions of fact exist regarding the side-effects which 
plaintiff Grundberg suffered and the adequacy of Upjohn1s 
warnings with regard to those side-effects. At oral argument, 
plaintiffs also contended that evidence of unalleged side-effects 
may be relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe11 requirement to the 
defendants comment k affirmative defense to strict liability. 
13 
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The court has determined to defer this last aspect of the matter, 
however, by providing an opportunity to the Utah Supreme Court to 
resolve the Comment k issues that are being certified. 
B. Unalleaed Side-Effects 
The court rejects plaintiffs1 first argument against 
defendants motion to limit the warning claims. Without 
question, a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn about all 
adverse side-effects which it knows or has reason to know of at 
the time the drug in question was manufactured. See supra note 
8. However, this does not mean, ipso facto, that evidence about 
all possible side-effects are relevant in a given case. This is 
true because in a failure to warn case a plaintiff can only 
recover for those injuries which were actually suffered. The 
learned intermediary doctrine does not dispose of the requirement 
of proving causation or damages.9 
The relevant parameters of a defendant's duty of care 
in a particular case are limited by the facts pertinent to the 
issues of causation and damages. Plaintiffs in a negligence case 
must establish a link, or proximate cause, between the injuries 
they allegedly suffered and the duty they claim was breached. 
9
 See, e^ fc, Barson v. E.R. Sauibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984) 
(recognizing learned intermediary doctrine and also requiring "that the conduct complained of 
was the cause in fact of the injury"); accord. McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1982); 
Dalke v. Upjohn Co.. 555 P.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1977); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Con).. 
642 F.Supp. 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). "Liability in 
the air, so to speak, will not do." W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 
325 (4th ed. 1971)# quoting Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 
1929) • The court fails to see how admitting evidence regarding 
Upjohnfs duty to warn about side-effects not alleged to have been 
suffered by plaintiff Grundberg has any relevance in this case. 
Discussing such duties and introducing such evidence could only 
confuse and unfairly prejudice the jury. See Wolf v. Proctor & 
Gamble Co.. 555 F.Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982)(evidence of unalleged 
drug injuries would only confuse the issues and cause jury to 
"lose sight of the actual injury being litigated1'). Accordingly, 
the court holds that plaintiffs1 failure to warn and inadequate 
warning claims are limited in scope to the side effects which 
plaintiff Grundberg alleges to have suffered. Evidence relating 
to adverse side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not alleged 
to have personally suffered will not be admitted. 
C. Side-Effect Warnings j.n pjspute 
What remains to determine is which adverse Halcion 
side-effects has plaintiff Grundberg alleged to have suffered, 
and of those that have been identified, which side-effect 
warnings are adequate as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs first argue that the extent of the Ms. 
Grundbergfs alleged Halcion caused side-effects is still an open 
question, because plaintiffs contend that they are still in the 
process of analyzing and determining the full extent of such 
15 
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side-effects. Plaintiffs have not argued, however, that they 
need more discovery on this issue. Plaintiff Grundbergfs alleged 
injuries occurred approximately two and a half years ago. Trial 
is set to commence in about four months and discovery is over 
except for a limited number of unrelated expert witness 
depositions. Plaintiff Grundberg has had a continuing duty to 
supplement her answers to interrogatories, and she has in fact 
filed some supplemental answers. 
One of the primary purposes of discovery is to identify 
and narrow the issues for trial. Plaintiff Grundberg1s answers 
to questions presented in depositions and in answers and 
supplemental answers to interrogatories has, as a matter of fact 
and law, limited the scope of plaintiffs1 claims. The court 
finds that plaintiffs have had sufficient time to identify those 
adverse side-effects which they claim were suffered by plaintiff 
Grundberg as a result of her ingestion of Halcion. Plaintiffs 
have no legitimate reason at this stage in the litigation to 
claim that the extent of Ms. Grundberg1 s injuries and side-
effects from Halcion are still unknown. Accordingly, the court 
holds that plaintiffs1 warning claims are limited in scope to 
those adverse side-effects which have been previously 
specifically identified as having been suffered by plaintiff 
Grundberg. 
At the time this motion was submitted for decision, 
plaintiffs claimed that Ms. Grundberg allegedly suffered the 
16 
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following fourteen specific adverse-side effects from taking 
Halcion: (1) amnesia, (2) anorexia, (3) confusion, (4) 
depersonalization, (5) derealization, (6) depression, (7) 
inability to concentrate, (8) dry mouth, (9) paranoia, (10) mouth 
sores, (11) panic, (12) voice changes, (13) oppressive assaultive 
behavior and (14) homicidal compulsion. Plaintiffs1 argue that 
Upjohn's warnings with regard to the first seven of these 
fourteen side effects were inadequate, and with regard to the 
last six side effects, plaintiffs1 claim that no warnings were 
given at all by Upjohn. Defendant Upjohn seeks summary judgment 
as to the first eight claimed side effects on the basis that 
Upjohnfs language used could not reasonably be attacked as 
inadequate as a matter of law. Plaintiffs apparently have 
conceded that Upjohn1s warning with regard to side-effect number 
8, "dry mouth,w was adequate inasmuch as this side effect is not 
mentioned in plaintiffs1 response memorandum nor in Dr. Oswald's 
affidavit submitted as support of plaintiffs1 position. 
The court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties, in 
addition to relevant portions of the affidavits of Ian Oswald, 
M.D., and Martin B. Scharf, Ph.D., submitted by plaintiffs, and 
concludes that material questions of fact exist as to the 
adequacy of Upjohn1 s warnings as to the following seven side 
effects allegedly suffered by plaintiff Grundberg: (1) amnesia, 
(2) anorexia, (3) confusion, (4) depersonalization, (5) 
derealization, (6) depression, (7) inability to concentrate. 
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Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the court 
concludes that material factual questions preclude a court 
finding that Upjohn's warnings as to these seven side-effects 
were adequate as a matter of law. Thus, insofar as .defendant 
Upjohn seeks summary judgment on these seven side-effect warning 
claims, that motion is denied. Defendant Upjohnfs motion is 
granted with respect to the eighth side effect that was the 
subject of its motion, "dry mouth.n Plaintiffs1 failure to warn 
claims regarding the remaining six alleged side-effects suffered 
by plaintiff Grundberg (paranoia, mouth sores, panic, voice 
changes, oppressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion) 
were not part of Upjohnfs motion and will be determined by the 
jury at trial along with the first seven side-effect warning 
claims. 
III. Motion to Strike 
The affidavit of Dr. Ian Oswald was submitted by 
plaintiffs in connection with their responses to defendant 
Upjohn1s motions for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs1 
strict liability and failure to warn claims. Defendants Motion 
to Strike Portions of Dr. Oswaldfs Affidavit is somewhat academic 
in light of the courts ruling in Part II of this opinion. 
Nevertheless, in the event that Dr. Oswaldfs affidavit will be 
used in the future (except to the Utah Supreme Court as part of 
subquestion C certified), defendant Upjohnfs Motion to Strike 
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Portions of that affidavit is granted to the extent that the 
affidavit as submitted refers to side-effects or warnings of 
side-effects which the court has concluded in part II of this 
opinion are no longer part of plaintiffs1 warning claims. 
Based upon the foregoing, 
(1) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Strict Liability Claim is 
STAYED pending final resolution by the Utah Supreme Court of the 
Order of Certification. 
(2) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs1 Warning Claims is GRANTED 
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted insofar as 
plaintiffs1 warning claims are limited in scope to the side-
effects which plaintiff Grundberg has specifically alleged to 
have suffered. Unalleged side-effects are dismissed as part of 
plaintiffs1 warning claims, as is the inadequate warning claim 
regarding the alleged side-effect of "dry mouth." Defendant's 
Motion is denied insofar as it seeks to dismiss the warning 
claims relating to the alleged side-effects of amnesia, anorexia, 
confusion, depersonalization, derealization, depression and 
inability to concentrate. This decision does not pertain to 
warning issues that may be involved in the "unavoidably unsafe" 
determination in defendant's Comment k affirmative defense in 
light of the pending Utah State Supreme Court certification on 
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Comment k. : 
(3) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Motion to 
Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Ian Oswald, M.D., is GRANTED. 
Those portions of the Oswald affidavit that refer to Upjohnfs 
warnings about side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not 
alleged to have suffered are STRICKEN, as are any other 
references to side-effects that plaintiff Grundberg has not 
alleged to have suffered or that are not substantially similar to 
side-affects that she alleges to have suffered as a result of 
taking Halcion. This Order regarding Dr. Oswald1s affidavit does 
not apply to matters certified to the Utah Supreme Court in this 
case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: DECEMBER 1 / , 1990. 
J//TH©MAS GREENE 
UWITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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